Afghanistan is a nation historically known for being at the center of intercontinental trade. Most recently Afghanistan finds itself at the center of a protracted and complicated international struggle. There are several issues internal to Afghanistan that are at odds or are contributing to the complex problems. Factors like government corruption, insurgent groups, tribal factions, and economic disparity are enough to challenge the management skills of any political or business leader. Add to that mix the external factors such as the influences of Pakistan, Iran, America, and China and it’s no wonder that progress is so slow to materialize.
Historically Afghanistan is known for two things, being at the center of the famed ‘Silk Road’ – the primary trade route between Europe and the Orient; and for it’s turbulent military and political landscape. Dating all the way back to the days of Alexander the Great, empires have initially conquered governments in this region, only to succumb to inevitable defeat at the hands of time, logistical complexities, and a people who are very patient and very proud.
INTERNAL FACTORS
Within Afghanistan there are many factors influencing the ever-present power struggles. Historically speaking, factors such as geography, religion, tribal diversity, and natural resources have always influenced Afghan quality of life and politics. Currently other factors such as the current government, the various insurgent groups opposing the government (or replacing it with their own shadow government), local populations and their tribal loyalties, and a myriad of economic factors (currency, poppies, education, mining) all contribute to a very complex domestic dynamic.
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) is a piecemeal entity with no real sense of direction. The perception among the general population is that GIROA officials in Kabul, the capitol, are so corrupt and disconnected from the realities of everyday life that they are the problem rather than the solution. The locals and Afghan Soldiers that I talk too all see their national leadership as greedy, tribalist, self-serving, and corrupt to the point of diverting most of any foreign aid to their own pockets. This perception is also largely true at the provincial levels where the governors are seen as manipulating the conditions toward their own financial gain. Even within the various pillars of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) there is a general acceptance and recognition of widespread corruption. Embezzlement, murder, treason, bribery, inter-departmental feuding, tribal loyalties, and ethnic biases all contribute to the banditry that passes for the Afghan security apparatus. Yet despite all the corruption, frequently ANSF is able to work together to accomplish their tactical objectives for any given mission.
Of course the enemy always gets a vote too. Nothing in combat operations, or an insurgency, happens in a vacuum. This kind of conflict is an unending series of action, reaction, and counter-reaction; often with the population as the target of propaganda promulgated by both sides. Unfortunately it is not merely a war of words. Rockets, roadside bombs, suicide bombers, vehicles filled with explosives, mortars, machine guns, and even small arms are used every day in attempts by one side to kill the other; all so either side can further manipulate the local population to support their side by demonstrating superior strength and resolve. There are several insurgent groups active in Afghanistan, the most infamous being the Taliban. But there is also the insurgent network supported by the Haqqani family from Pakistan, the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), Taj Mir Jawad network, among others. Each region seems to have it’s own unique small insurgent group competing with the larger networks like Taliban and Haqqani.
Another significant internal factor is the economy. Within the broad scope of the Afghan economy are several sub-factors such as the state of the Afghani currency, the annual poppy harvest, mining, and education. Several different currencies are floating throughout the banks in Afghanistan. Between the US Dollar, the Pakistani Rupee, the Iranian Rial, and the Chinese Yuan, there is much competition for the fledgeling Afghani, which is just trying to survive. Having a strong national currency will go a long way toward helping the people of Afghanistan feel like their nation is strong enough to stand on it’s own. Historically one of the most reliable sources of income in the rural areas has been the poppy harvest and the subsequent opium trade; despite it being illegal and therefore untaxed income because it is kept under the table. But with the international political pressure to reduce the supply of illegal narcotics, to include heroin, many poppy fields are burned to stem the flow of opium flowing into the illicit drug markets. Unfortunately this also costs many Afghan farmers their livelihood and serves to help keep the economy depressed. Another natural resource that could boost the Afghan economy is the mining of natural resources like copper. But instead of an Afghan company owning and working the copper mines, the rights were sold to the Chinese and now Afghanistan is not able to fully reap the benefits of their own natural resources. But this inability to take advantage of the natural gifts of the land is a direct result of the state of education. While the major cities of Kabul and Kandahar have decent education systems, most of the country’s children are stuck in the cycle of sacrificing technical education to work the family business. Or worse, they get stuck attending a madrassa that only teaches religious studies without any coverage of math or the hard sciences. This perpetuates generation after generation of poorly educated citizens that lack the technical expertise or even the ability to learn the skills required to domesticate the industries currently contracted beyond Afghanistan’s borders. When the nation fails to produce it’s own geologists, who can the government trust to safely and effectively mine resources but the underbidding foreign companies?
Adding complexity to the already difficult domestic situation are the geography, religious climate, and cultural diversity and related prejudices. Geographically the country is a large mountain range surrounded by a ring of cities and towns scattered throughout more diverse terrain ranging from smaller mountain ranges to desert plains. Religiously the country is staunchly Muslim. But most of the rural population is not literate enough to learn the Qur’an for themselves so people have to trust the words of their Mullahs and Imams. The inherent risk there is that, as with any position of power, those with the power are subject to human nature and the greed and corruption that can often follow. Within the ANSF one of the most important factors is the cultural diversity and the accompanying prejudices. There are several ethnic groups who all have to work together but they all have their biases. Pashto speakers don’t like Dari/Farsi speakers. Hazarras, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and other non-Pashtuns get picked on by the Pashtuns. This longstanding bitterness stems from invasions centuries ago by those other tribes into Pashtun lands that were repelled, but the people who stayed behind were welcomed into Pashtun society. However, old tribal loyalties trumped new citizenship and the ethnic minorities often served the interests of their ancestral homes as opposed to their adopted one. At least that is the reality from the Pashtun perspective. But in non-Pashtun areas the roles are reversed. These cultural prejudices, linguistic prejudices, and tribal loyalties prevent Afghans from developing the sense of nationalism that most westerners have come to take for granted.
EXTERNAL FACTORS
Given the complex internal issues competing within Afghanistan it is no surprise that the country is in a near constant state of turmoil. Yet there are also several external factors making things even more complicated. Not only is there the current American/UN/NATO involvement, but Russia is still a lingering influence along with Iran. But no foreign power has more influence or is closer to the tip of any Afghan’s tongue than Pakistan.
For most westerners the most relevant external factor in Afghanistan is the American influence. Between American military presence being the prime crutch that ANSF leans on, American dollars being the backing behind the Afghan economy, and American political influence maintaining some semblance of stability in Kabul, it is very hard to imagine any sort of modern Afghanistan without constant and immediate American involvement in nearly every aspect. American helicopters striking fear into the hearts of insurgents, as well as shuttling wounded Afghans to the nearest medical treatment facility is something every single Afghan I’ve spoken with fears will go away after 2014.
No Asian country is without some form of Russian influence. The Bear that takes up so much space and natural resources naturally commands a certain amount of respect. This is especially true in Afghanistan where the Russians spent a decade of blood and treasure attempting to preserve a regime that would promote and perpetuate Soviet influence in southern Asia. Plus Afghanistan was a bordering nation of the USSR and a natural wedge between Iran and Pakistan, two influential states that successfully resisted Soviet control. Many of the senior leaders within ANSF and the Afghan population as a whole remember the Soviet occupation and this memory serves to inform many of their expectations of the American influence on the Islamic government they are trying to establish and perpetuate in Kabul. Even now, due to their status as a permanent voting member of the UN Security Council, Russia has a very direct say in certain aspects of Afghan policy. Additionally their geographic proximity and their seeming endless black market influence both keep Russia constantly involved in the inner workings of Afghan economics and politics, as well as that of most of the rest of Asia.
Any discussion of foreign influence within Afghanistan would not be complete without mentioning Britain. Having gone to war in Afghanistan on three separate occasions, as well as being the European arbiter of the current political divisions, British influence is readily seen. The current border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Durand Line, is a product of British and Indian diplomacy that is still in effect today. Because Afghans have a long memory and an appreciation for history, there is much mistrust of Britain within Afghanistan despite the last Anglo-Afghan war lasting five months (April through August) in 1919.
Iran is one of two complex Islamic states that have a vested interest in the future of Afghanistan. Both nations share the Dari/Farsi language and an Islamist government. But Iran is 90% Shia while Afghanistan is roughly 80% Sunni. Also Iran is mostly ethnically Persian while Afghanistan is mostly ethnically Pashtun. Also Iran and Pakistan geographically seal Afghanistan off from access to the Arabian Gulf and any possibility of having any sort of sea based trade because they can’t have a deep water port. Because Iran is one of a several exporters of goods to Afghanistan, their economy is partially tied to that of Afghanistan. On the security side, competing factions within Iran (on one side the fundamentalists loyal to the Mullahs, and the other side the capitalists) compete for influence on the Afghan side of the border. Unfortunately part of that competition involves elements in Iran providing weapons, ammunition, and in some cases fighters to attack ANSF and NATO troops in an effort to keep the security situation near the border unstable, which then perpetuates a dependence on Iranian trade instead of self sufficient Afghan production.
The same issue is one of the factors for Pakistan. Pakistani currency and goods are commonly found throughout eastern Afghanistan and even in the capital city of Kabul. Should Afghanistan become secure enough and strong enough to produce their own crops and consumer goods, the market for Pakistani products would be much smaller and therefore would have a significantly negative impact on Pakistan’s economy. Another factor contributing to the complexity of the Pakistan problem is India. Pakistan has no desire to be wedged between two strong powers. Among the Afghan population there is a strong sense of friendship toward India. Should Afghanistan become completely independent and strong and decide to ally themselves with India, Pakistan would then be surrounded by adversarial nations, one of whom is a nuclear power. So from a security standpoint it would appear to be in Pakistan’s best interest to prevent Afghanistan from growing into a formidable opponent either by stunting Afghan growth or by sabotaging Afghan/Indian relations. It would seem to be much easier in the near term to aid in perpetuating an insecure and unstable Afghanistan. Of course not all elements within Pakistan are united in that goal. I could write volumes on the complexities and nuances of politics in Pakistan. But for this work we’ll just stick to the divisions within the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the military leadership, the political leadership, the religious leadership, and the under-governed tribal regions. Some factions within ISI, as mentioned above, fear a strong Afghanistan while other factions see Afghans as brothers, kindred Muslims who should be a natural ally. The military leadership doesn’t want to have to worry about strong forces on both sides of the country given the ongoing dispute with India over the Kashmir region. The religious leadership would like nothing more than to see a reunification of the region under one big Islamic umbrella. Politicians in Pakistan, as with politicians everywhere, can’t seem to agree on much of anything. But one thing they seem to share common ground on is a desire to prevent any expiration of the Durand Line. The Durand Line established what is the current Afghan-Pakistan border as part of a Memorandum of Understanding between the British government and that of India in 1893. Subsequent treaties have reaffirmed the Durand Line as the defacto international border despite the current Afghan leadership claims that the line was never recognized by Afghanistan or that it should have expired after 100 years, in 1993. Unfortunately the line politically divided Pashtun tribal lands and split the tribes onto both sides of the border, as well as the same for Baloch and other ethnic groups indigenous tribes. Removal of the line and establishing a border where the current Afghan government claims it should be would severely reduce Pakistani territory, give Afghanistan it’s own coast access and deep water port, and significantly curtail Pakistan’s tax revenue base. After 120 years of border status-quo Pakistan has no desire whatsoever to turn back the clock and cede roughly half of their territory, roughly half their access to the Arabian Sea, and a significant portion of their population just so Afghanistan can become stronger and thereby further reduce Pakistan’s economic strength.
Given all these complicated and competing external factors influencing Afghanistan, along with all the aforementioned internal issues, one could make a convincing argument for why the insurgency will succeed. But one could also make a convincing argument for why the insurgency will fail. Ultimately it comes down to the political will of the Afghan population.
WHY THE INSURGENCY WILL SUCCEED
Rampant corruption throughout GIROA will continue to plague the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the people. One thing the insurgency does very well is promulgate their information operations campaign capitalizing on the frequent fraudulence and abuses within GIROA. While the government runs very patriotic and values based advertisements on television, the Taliban spokesman is on Twitter lambasting the government at every opportunity for it’s many abuses and inconsistencies; and those opportunities arise several times a day.
Traditionally the Afghan people side with whomever they perceive to be the strongest and therefore most likely to secure political power for themselves; whether that is the Soviet occupation, the brutal Taliban of the 1990s, the technologically superior American military, or the new Taliban focused on providing more effective and equitable governance. There are frequent rumors of local GIROA officials turning to the Taliban shadow government when disputes arise that the official bureaucracy can’t effectively resolve.
Not only is governance sometimes too bogged down by bureaucracy, but even ANSF frequently can’t seem to master fundamentals like logistics and personnel. Then there’s the corruption of military leadership. I’ve heard stories of Afghan Army leaders, generals and colonels, misreporting resource expenditures and diverting things like fuel and firewood to sell it on the open market and pocket the proceeds. This type of practice is an unfortunate necessity when leadership positions are allocated by the highest bidder. Rumor has it that a battalion command costs roughly $30,000 US, and a brigade command roughly $100,000. Naturally families with money also produce the confidence, and sometimes arrogance, that will breed a moderately effective leader. But ideally those positions should be filled based on merit, not based on tribal loyalties, ethnic loyalties, or for profit. All this practice does is perpetuate corruption, and the junior Soldiers and leaders see it. The young generation within ANSF are still idealistic enough to believe in a military or police meritocracy. They have a stronger sense of nationalism. They are more willing to put aside the tribal, ethnic, or linguistic prejudices of their parents generation and work toward the common good. But the corruption at the senior levels is crushing that spirit, which will allow the insurgency to appear to be the most attractive alternative. Recruitment is low across ANSF, in large part because there is little faith in the senior leadership. Who wants to put their life on the line and possibly die working for someone who steals a few percent of their paycheck every month in order to remain in power? What kind of trust does that engender with the rank and file? When the insurgency offers a better alternative – more security, better governance, and the appearance of equitable justice – the population at large will naturally throw their support behind legitimizing the insurgency and their ascension to power.
WHY THE INSURGENCY WILL LOSE
Perceptions go a long way in politics, and GIROA still gives the perception of strength and power. The ability to broadcast through traditional media the themes and messages favorable to GIROA conveys a message of strength and competence. This perception of popular support naturally engenders more support because everyone wants to be associated with a winner. Projecting prosperity and confidence sends the message that the government is a winner.
Related to that theme of being a winner and having popular support is reinforced by the tactical superiority of ANSF. Despite all the corruption and logistical challenges, ANSF is still able to defeat insurgent forces in traditional conflict. Insurgent forces fear ANSF and will not directly engage because their firepower is inferior to that of ANSF. This military superiority, however tenuous, also projects strength which, as discussed above, goes a very long way with the Afghan masses.
Money talks, this is a universal truth. In the case of Afghanistan the government has the money, or at least they get large quantities from America and the UN. While the Taliban and other insurgent groups are funded from foreign donations and illicit trade, GIROA gets billions of dollars annually in official foreign aid, plus material support in the form of military equipment, agricultural equipment, foreign investment, and diplomatic cooperation. This wealth and perception of international legitimacy is a common image displayed to the Afghan people, and therefore a powerful force for bolstering the image of GIROA as a winner and worthy of popular support.
Perhaps the biggest missed opportunities on the part of GIROA are the civilian casualties inflicted by insurgent military actions. Few things can erode the perception of a caring government like when that entity kills innocent women and children. For example, earlier this summer a suicide bomber was targeting a joint ANSF/US patrol in Kabul. But the bomber, in an attempt to maximize the effect of the explosive device, also killed dozens of civilians, to include at least 9 children. If GIROA can use instances like this to portray the insurgent factions as uncaring and as monsters, that Afghan children are not safe with these factions in existence let alone in power, then GIROA will be able to defeat the insurgency because no sane population group would willingly and knowingly support their own extermination.
CONCLUSION
As in any insurgency, the deciding factor is political will. Ultimately whomever can co-opt the preponderance of political will is the entity which will secure control of Afghanistan’s future. GIROA can do it if they can effectively eschew the rampant corruption and put aside their long held prejudices long enough to effectively govern. If GIROA can provide equitable governance and a lasting security for the people, then the people will unequivocally support them. But if the Taliban continues to have success in undermining GIROA governance and security efforts, then the current manifestation of GIROA will be replaced by the Taliban version of a benevolent Emirate.
MY PREDICTION
This is the section where I get to express my opinions on where I think Afghanistan is headed and why, as well as what I think about those reasons why. Be prepared for a significant amount of expressed disgust.
Two factors drive my conclusion that the Taliban will return to power after 2014. First is the inability of GIROA to curtail their corruption, and the second is an abject lack of American political leadership, vision, or will.
I think that the deeply entrenched corruption will be too much for GIROA to overcome and the Taliban will effectively form an alliance of local shadow governments, allowing them to return to power on the national level. However I do not believe that it will be the same brutal regime that we saw prior to November 2001 for two reasons. One is that the new Taliban is already showing the ability to effectively govern and a transition away from hardline fundamentalist Islam. They have done things like civil works projects and opening schools, to include schools for girls, as well as settle tribal disputes through application of mutually acceptable justice and courts. The second reason involves, of all things, the Boston Marathon. When the Tsarnaev brothers bombed the finish of the Boston Marathon the Taliban was very quick to point out that they had absolutely nothing to do with it and no association with the brothers. They publicly acknowledged that they did not want to relive the resounding defeat they suffered in 2001 & 2002. According to reflections of hindsight within the Taliban, there was not a consensus on the tactics employed both domestically and internationally. It seems as though there were elements within the Taliban who found no future in the brutality and terrorism espoused by Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. But those voices of dissent were silenced whenever they spoke up, so people holding those views quickly learned to keep their opinions to themselves in order to survive. But now those more progressive views are the dominant political ideology within the Taliban, and I think this will allow them to secure popular support and unseat the current manifestation of GIROA.
But the road is not fraught with peril. Because American and other western political leadership is so risk averse, so afraid of the political damage at home that loss of life can bring, there is no strong message of resolve to secure Afghanistan and see the admittedly misguided foray into nation-building through to a successful conclusion, let alone clearly define what a successful conclusion would look like. There is no political emphasis on defining and achieving any sort of measurable victory in Afghanistan. There is only political posturing to secure a legacy of being on the right side of history. It seems to me that no politicians care about actual outcomes, they only care about the perceptions that will secure power and votes for themselves. They are so afraid of taking a principled stand on Afghanistan, or most any other issue for that matter, that they fail to actually lead and instead are continually campaigning. This is my perception of both major American political parties and nearly every politician associated with them. There is a stark lack of vision and leadership when it comes to western policy toward Afghanistan, and the local Afghans see that as a sign of apathy and/or weakness. This lack of vision and leadership is most evident in how the military withdrawal is being managed and what is driving the decisions along the way. There is no talk among the political and senior military leadership of setting conditions for future Afghan success, merely making sure we meet an arbitrary timeline. There are no consequences or incentives for ISAF related to actually achieving any measure of improved security or governance. At the end of 2014 American combat forces will no longer operate in Afghanistan regardless of the conditions. The nation could revert back to bitter tribal civil war and still nothing would change the political drive to leave. What angers me the most about this is that so many lives have been lost and so much treasure spent here, all for it to be thrown away because American politicians care more about their next campaign, their perceived legacy, or their personal financial backing more than they care about actually doing what is right.
So the Afghan populous knows they are on their own, and while they still hope for American involvement to help ensure their physical and fiscal security, they are coming to grips with the reality and aligning themselves with whomever they feel will ensure their own survival.
Colin R. LeBeau 